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ABSTRACT
This paper is motivated by a set of cross-country observations on labor productivity growth
among industrial countries over the period 1960-1997. In particular, we show that over this period, the
speed of convergence among industrialized countries has decreased substantially while the negative effect
of a country’s own employment growth (or labor force growth) on labor productivity has increased
dramatically. The main contribution of the paper is to show how these observations are consistent with
the view that industrialized countries have been undergoing a particularly drastic technological revolution
over the recent past. In effect, we show how the process of endogenous technological adoption, following
the diffusion of a general purpose technology, can explain these observations by causing the emergence
of an AK accumulation phase where demographic factors temporarily become an major determinant of
labor productivity growth. Our estimation of the model implies that the AK phase has been in effect since
the early to mid-seventies, but that this phase may now be coming to an end. An important contribution
of the paper is to analyze growth experiences across advanced industrialized countries within an open
economy framework and to evaluate the explanation by estimating a multicountry dynamic general
model.
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Neoclassical growth theory predicts that, along a transitional path, countries with higher
rates of labor force growth should exhibit less labor productivity growth due to the need to
use scarce capital to equip new workers. Moreover, the same theoretical framework suggests
that, as countries become more integrated over time | i.e. in the presence of globalization
| such a demographic related determinant of productivity growth should diminish, while
the speed of convergence should increase due to the equalizing forces of international capital
°ows. However, as we will show, the data for major industrial countries since 1960 point
towards the opposite pattern, that is, the tradeo® between labor productivity growth and
labor force growth (or employment growth) appears to have increased over the recent past
and the speed of convergence has decreased substantially. The object of the paper is to shed
light on these observations.1
The primary motivation for our analysis is a series of cross{country regression regarding
the determinants of labor productivity growth. As we will show, there has been a rather
drastic change in the main observable determinants in labor productivity growth over the
period 1960{97. In particular, over the ¯rst half of this period, the experience of industrial
countries indicated only a small negative | generally insigni¯cant | link between labor force
growth (or employment growth) and the growth of output{per{worker. This observation is
rather unsurprising and consistent with the view that rich industrialized countries may be well
integrated and therefore country speci¯c demographic factors, such as labor force growth, are
not necessarily expected to be a very important determinant of labor productivity growth.
However, over time, this relationship has radically changed. In e®ect, over the more recent
period, we show that labor force growth has come to exhibit a very large and systematic
negative link with labor productivity. We ¯nd such relationship to be surprisingly robust to
instrument variable strategies, to the inclusion of additional regressors, and to the choice of
countries. Moreover, we show that the speed of convergence among these countries decreased
substantially over the period, with convergence virtually becoming an irrelevant force over
the recent past.
This paper proposes a technology based explanation to the above observations. In par-
ticular, we argue that this pattern may likely be the cross{country expression of a process
1Many economists that have compared economic performance across major industrialized countries since the
mid{seventies have noticed that most countries line up as either successes in employment growth or successes
in labor productivity growth, but not both. At a qualitative level, such an observation is not puzzling since it
is consistent with standard growth theory. However, we will show that a more quantitative look at the data
reveals a quite intriguing and puzzling pattern.
1of endogenous technological adoption following the arrival of new means of production. In
a sense, our explanation can be seen as providing evidence to the view that industrialized
countries have been recently undergoing a major technological revolution of the kind empha-
sized, among others, by Caselli (1999), Basu and Weil (1998) and Zeira (1998). To make
our point, we extend a standard neo{classical growth model along two dimensions. First,
we allow for radical technological change in the form of the arrival and dissemination of an
alternative means of production.2 This type of technological change is meant to capture
ideas emphasized in the General Purpose Technology (GPT) literature.3 Secondly, we allow
countries to be linked through international capital market as to make the model relevant for
the set of advanced industrialized countries under study.4
Using this model, we show why countries with di®erent rates of labor force growth would
adjust di®erently to a major technological change.5 In particular, the model illustrates how
the arrival of an alternative production process temporarily creates an AK type accumula-
tion phase which triggers a large negative tradeo® between employment growth and labor
productivity growth. The AK phase arises endogenously in our model as the result of de-
centralized decisions regarding the appropriate speed by which to adopt the new technology.
In particular, because of the AK structure, slower capital deepening is experienced by high
population growth countries since there is no counterbalancing force to trigger an in°ow of
capital. The central aspect of the paper is to show that the model can quantitatively replicate
the observed changes in the cross{country regressions.
Our main conclusion from ¯tting the model to the data are that (i) over the period 1960{
1997 advanced industrialized countries appear to have transited from a technology where
accumulable factors accounted for approximately a 50% share of income to a new means of
production where they represent more than 60% of income, (ii) industrialized countries have
adjusted at di®erent speeds to this technological change due in large part to di®erences in
their rates of labor force growth. In particular, we ¯nd that countries with high rates of
labor force growth have not been able to take advantage as quickly of the new opportunities
associated with capital deepening, but that this disadvantage may now have come to an end.
2In this paper we are pursuing a technology based explanation to the set of observations. A potentially
relevant alternative explanation is the increase globalization of the economy. In future work we plan to explore
this possibility and compare its merits with the technology based explanation developed here.
3See for example Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995).
4We do not assume that international capital mobility is perfect. Instead, we introduce a friction in the
form of an intermediation cost which increases with the size of capital °ows.
5A similar idea is pursued in Beaudry and Green (2001), but there the focus is on the e®ects of technological
change on changes in the returns to education across countries.
2The remaining sections of the paper are structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss a
series of cross{country regressions linking output{per{worker to labor force growth and initial
levels of output{per{worker. In Section 3, we present our baseline growth model where we
allow technological change to arrive in both the form of labor augmenting progress and in the
form of an increased access to a alternative means of producing goods. Throughout section 3,
we allow for only one accumulable factor which we refer to as capital. However, this capital
stock should be thought as an aggregate of human and physical capital. We then derive the
main theoretical implications of the model and provide a quantitative evaluation. In section
4, we extend the model to explicitly distinguish between human and physical capital, and
we show how such an extended model helps explain the data. Finally, a last section o®ers
concluding comments.
2 Labor Productivity Growth and Demographics: Some In-
triguing Observations
In this section, we report a set of cross{country regressions relating growth in output{per{
worker to labor force growth and the initial level of output{per{worker. We focus exclusively
on the experiences of the 18 richest industrialized countries (as de¯ned by their level of GDP{
per{capita in 1960) since it is a set of countries for which assuming common access to frontier
technological opportunities appears most plausible. The 18 countries forming our sample are
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
and the United States.6 The data are taken from the OECD statistical compendium 1999,
unless indicated otherwise.7
The main observation that we want to highlight is the extent to which the role of initial
conditions and labor force growth in explaining labor productivity growth has changed over
the 1960{1997 period. To see this more clearly, we begin by reporting estimates associated
with a series of very simple rolling regressions. Our basic regression consists of regressing the
growth in output{per{worker8 on the growth in labor force and the initial level of output{
6Our sample consists of the set of industrial countries where the level of per{capita{income in 1960 was
greater that 48% of the US level. We found it natural to cut the sample at this point since it is where there was
a rather large break in the data. For example, the next richest industrialized countries had per{capita{incomes
below one third of the US level in 1960.
7The data on GDP in US$, which is needed to calculate comparable initial levels of output{per{worker,
are taken from the Heston and Summers data set.
8Output{per{worker is measured as GDP divided by total employment. However, our ¯ndings are robust
to the use of private output per private employee as a measure of output{per{worker.
3per{worker, with each variable measured in relation to the given window. We chose a size of
window of 19 years since it corresponds to half of our sample length. Nevertheless, in order
to check the robustness of our results, we also explored window sizes between 15 to 25 years,
all of which led to similar conclusions.
We estimated the relationship using ordinary least squares (OLS) and weighted least
squares (WLS). In the latter case, the weights used in estimation correspond to the square
root of the active population.9 Note that the main di®erence between our results by OLS and
WLS are due to reducing the weight of Luxembourg and Iceland. Figures 1 and 2 plot the
estimates of this relationship across the di®erent windows. Figure 1 reports the estimated
speed of convergence across the di®erent windows, that is, it reports the estimated e®ect of
the initial level of output{per{worker on the growth in output{per{worker for each window.
The two di®erent lines on the graph correspond to the estimates using OLS and WLS. Note
that the years on the X{axis in these ¯gures correspond to the initial year of the window, that
is, it begins in 1960 | for the 1960{1978 window | and ends in 1979 with the 1979{1997
window. Finally, all growth rates are calculated in yearly rates.10
Figure 1: Estimated Speed of Convergence




























Figure 1 indicates that initially (over the windows starting in the early 60s), industrial
countries exhibited rapid convergence, with a signi¯cant speed of convergence of around 3.5%
9Our measure of active population corresponds to all individuals aged between 15 and 64.
10For windows starting after 1971, the rates of growth for West Germany were calculated using the yearly
average up to 1991, in order to avoid any e®ect related to the German reuni¯cation.
4Figure 2: Estimated E®ect of 1% Labor Force Growth on Yearly Labor Productivity Growth






























per year. However, over the sample period, this speed of convergence decreased substantially.
In e®ect, in the latter period | for example the 1979{97 window | our estimates of the
speed of convergence is divided by almost 3 relative to the 1960{1978 period, with the e®ect
becoming statistically insigni¯cant towards the end of the period. Although, by itself, this
observation may not be very surprising, when juxtaposed with the changing e®ect of labor
force growth, it becomes quite intriguing. Figure 2 plots the estimated e®ect of labor force
growth on the growth of output{per{worker. In contrast to ¯gure 1, we see the importance
of this e®ect increase over time. In particular, our estimates of the e®ect starts near zero
(for the 1960{1978 window) and gradually increases in importance as it reaches an estimate
greater than -0.5 over time. Note that an estimate of -0.5 implies that a country with a
growth in labor force of 1% experienced on average a growth in output{per{worker of 0.5%
per{year less than a country with a zero growth in labor force (holding constant the initial
level of labor productivity). To get a more precise idea of the magnitude and signi¯cance of
the e®ects at the beginning and the end of the sample, table 1 reports the OLS and WLS
estimates of these e®ects for the ¯rst and last window. In both cases, note that the estimates
of the ¯rst and last window are found to be statistically di®erent from each other at the 1%
con¯dence level.
In order to further emphasize the magnitude of the change, in ¯gure 3 we plot the ratio
of these two coe±cients for both estimated cases (OLS and WLS), that is, the ratio of the
5Table 1: Cross-Country Regressions for Growth of Output-per-capita
Init.Y=N % ¢ LF Init.Y=N % ¢ LF
Window 1960-1978 1979-97
(1),OLS -0.031 -0.234 -0.013 -0.503
(0.007) (0.175) (0.014) (0.212)
(2), WLS -0.034 -0.013 -0.007 -0.669
(0.007) (0.240) (0.005) (0.139)
Note: Standard errors between parenthesis. Weights used in WLS is the
square root of the countries' active population.
e®ect of labor force growth relative to the speed of convergence. Within a standard Solow
growth model, this ratio can be interpreted as an estimate of the long{run e®ect on the
level of labor productivity of a 1% di®erence in the growth of labor force. As can be seen
from the ¯gure, this ratio was quite close to zero | less than 8% in the early period, |
but increased to more than 40% (!!) in the later part of the sample. Although we are not
claiming that this ratio appropriately re°ects the long{run e®ect of labor force growth, we
nevertheless believe that the change in this ratio summarizes our claim that the link between
labor force growth and labor productivity growth has became surprisingly strong over the
recent past. Before exploring the reason for the pattern presented in ¯gures 1{3, we ¯rst
Figure 3: Implied Long{Run E®ect of -1% Labor Force Growth


















need to further establish its robustness. In particular, we want to claim that the pattern
6presented in these ¯gures likely re°ects a change in the causal structure running from labor
force growth and initial conditions to labor productivity growth. Hence, to make such a claim
plausible, we need to discuss potential issues related to the endogeneity of regressors and the
omission of variables.11 To this end, we explored several changes in speci¯cation, sample and
alternative instrumental variable strategies. Tables 1 through 3 report a small subset of cases
we considered.12 For these cases, we report the estimate for the ¯rst window covering the
period 1960{78, and the estimates associated with the last window 1979{1997. Furthermore,
we report the OLS and WLS estimates for our sample of 18 countries. As will be shown, we
found the pattern of increased importance of labor force growth (or employment growth) and
decreased importance of convergence be to very robust.
The ¯rst issue we want to address is whether the pattern we are documenting could
simply be capturing the indirect e®ects of certain labor market policies which may have
favored labor productivity at the cost of increasing unemployment.13 If this were the whole
story, it would have nothing to do with the type of interaction between technological adoption
and demographically driven employment growth which we believe has been important.14 To
see whether this could be the case, we include as an additional regressor the change in the
countries unemployment rate over the corresponding period. The corresponding estimates are
reported in panel 1 of table 2. As can be seen, the inclusion of the change in unemployment
does not change the pattern we are emphasizing. We still observe the decrease in the speed
of convergence and a similar increase in the importance of labor force growth in a®ecting
labor productivity. In fact, our point estimates for both these variables are almost una®ected
by the inclusion of the change in the rate of unemployment, both in terms of signi¯cance












+ ®2;t¢nLFi;t + ®3;tXi;t+n + ²i;t+n
Where ¢nzt = (log(zt+n) ¡ log(zt))=n, Yi;t=Li;t is labor productivity in country i at time t, n is the size of
the window, LF is the size of the labor force, and X is a vector or other factors a®ecting labor productivity
growth.
In our basic speci¯cation we did not include any Xi;t variables. The omission of relevant X is not a problem
as long as they are not correlated with our two regressors of interest. However, since this may not be the case,
in what follows we examine how the introduction of Xs a®ect our observations.
12Besides the cases we report, we also veri¯ed the robustness of our results with respect to controlling for
changes in education attainment, the importance of immigration and the age composition of the labor force.
13See Blanchard (1997) for a discussion along these lines.
14Many economists argue that high labor productivity growth in Europe may have been caused mainly by
institutions that have restricted employment. Our view is that this interpretation of the European experience
is much too restrictive in that it does not recognize that demographic factors may have been an even more
important factor for high labor productivity growth than what can be accounted for by the increase in
unemployment.
7and magnitude for the whole sample. Moreover, our estimates of the e®ect of a change in
unemployment on labor productivity are not found to be statistically signi¯cant in either the
earlier or later sample. Hence, the pattern we are emphasizing does not appear to be driven
simply by the behavior of unemployment: something more akin to an increased tradeo®
between employment growth and productivity growth appears to be at work.
To further clarify this last point, in panel B of table 2 we use the growth in employment
instead of the growth in the labor force as a regressor in addition to the initial level of
output{per{worker. In panel C of table 2, we further include the change in the rate of
unemployment. The estimates in panel B are very similar to those of table 1, suggesting
that it is demographic factors, through their e®ect on employment, which have increased in
importance. Furthermore, in panel C we see that the change in the rate of unemployment is
not a signi¯cant predictor of labor productivity growth once the e®ect of employment growth
is taken into account. In other words, the data suggest that there has been an increase in
the tradeo® between employment growth and productivity growth over this period regardless
of the reason for the increased employment. Hence, the results from table 2 suggest that it
is demographic factors that have played the dominant role in the process we are describing,
not changes in unemployment | although we recognize that the later may have been a
contributing factor.
The second issue we want to address is the robustness of our results to the inclusion of
investment rates (in log form) as an additional regressor.15 Our investment rate variable was
constructed as the average of the ratio of real investment in structures and equipment as a
fraction of real GDP. In table 3, we report our estimates of convergence speed and the e®ects
of labor force growth when the window{speci¯c average rate of investment is included as an
additional regressor. As can be seen from table 3, the inclusion of the rate of investment
again leaves virtually unaltered our basic observations.
The third issue we choose to highlight is the extent to which the patterns in ¯gures 1 and
2 may be driven by a particular set of countries, in this case, the predominantly anglo{saxon
countries | i.e. the US, the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. To explore this
issue, we ran our rolling regressions including a dummy variable for the ¯ve predominantly
anglo{saxon countries (where the e®ect of the dummy variable is allowed to vary over time).
The results of this estimation are reported in panel A of table 4. In panel B, we report
the ¯rst and last window of the WLS estimate for the case where we exclude all 5 Anglo{
15Although not reported, we also veri¯ed the robustness of our results with respect to the inclusion of
changes in education attainment.
8Table 2: Cross-Country Regressions: Controlling for the Change in the Unemployment Rate
Panel A
Init. Y
N % ¢ LF ¢ Ur Init. Y
N % ¢ LF ¢ Ur
Window 1960-78 1979-97
(1), OLS -0.031 -0.166 .223 -.011 -0.480 .706
(0.007) (0.181) (1.073) (0.015) (0.232) (1.297)
(2), WLS -0.039 0.085 -2.071 -0.005 -0.614 0.442
(0.006) (0.244) (1.509) (0.006) (0.153) (.502)
Panel B
Init. Y
N % ¢ Empl. ¢ Ur Init. Y
N % ¢ Empl. ¢ Ur
Window 1960-78 1979-97
(3), OLS -0.031 -0.237 | -0.011 -0.477 |
(0.007) (0.175) (0.014) (0.194)
(4), WLS -0.035 0.042 | -0.005 -0.627 |
(0.008) (0.250) (0.006) (0.115)
Panel C
(5), OLS -0.035 -0.166 .230 -0.011 -0.461 -0.197
(0.007) (0.183) (1.229) (0.015) (0.230) (1.402)
(6), WLS -0.039 0.020 -.998 -0.005 -0.612 -0.229
(0.011) (0.258) (1.711) (0.006) (0.152) (.588)
Note: Standard errors between parenthesis. Weights used in WLS is the
square root of the countries' active population.
Table 3: Cross-Country Regressions: Controlling for Investment Rate
Init. Y
N % ¢ LF I
Y Init. Y
N % ¢ LF I
Y
Window 1960-78 1979-97
(1), OLS -0.032 -0.231 0.001 -0.007 -0.638 0.020
(0.008) (0.182) (0.008) (0.007) (0.222) (0.013)
(2), WLS -0.028 0.009 0.018 -0.003 -0.746 0.009
(0.007) (0.223) (1.865) (0.006) (0.151) (0.008)
Note: Standard errors between parenthesis.
9Table 4: Cross-Country Regressions: Controlling for Anglo-saxon Countries
Panel A
Init. Y
N % ¢ LF Dummy Init. Y
N % ¢ LF Dummy
Window 1960-78 1979-97
(1), OLS -0.029 -0.195 -0.006 -0.013 -0.482 -0.002
(0.008) (0.185) (0.004) (0.015) (0.224) (0.004)
(2), WLS -0.024 0.057 -0.006 -0.007 -0.668 -0.002
(0.006) (0.181) (.004) (0.006) (0.152) (0.004)
Panel B
Window 1960-78 1979-97
(1), WLS 13-countries -0.041 -0.088 | -0.024 -0.771 |
(0.012) (0.370) (0.014) (0.224)
(2), WLS 14-countries -0.058 0.242 | -0.006 -0.832 |
(0.013) (0.441) (0.008) (0.156)
Note: standard errors between parenthesis. The 13 country sample excludes: US,Canada, Australia,
New Zealand and the UK. The 14 country sample excludes: US, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand. Weights used in WLS is the square root of the countries' active population.
saxon countries from our sample, which leaves us with a sample of 13 countries, and the
case where we exclude only the non{european economies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand
and the US, leaving us with 14 countries. As can be seen in the table, the e®ects we have
been emphasizing are not driven solely by the anglo{saxon countries, since they appear in
both restricted sub{samples. In fact, for our non{anglo{saxon sub{sample, the increased
importance of labor force growth is estimated to be at least as important with the coe±cient
on labor force growth reaching close to -0.8 in the 1979{1997 window.
As a last robustness check, we explore two instrumental variable strategies aimed at
addressing the possible endogeneity labor force growth. In the ¯rst case, we instrument labor
force growth by the growth in the active population over each given window, which is a time
varying instrument. In the second case, we instrument the labor force growth in each window
by the growth in active population observed in the period 1960{1978, which is a non{time{
varying instrument. The ¯rst procedure has the potential of mitigating potential biases that
could be due to the endogeneity of participation decision. The second procedure, by using
a time{invariant instrument, has the potential of minimizing simultaneity biases due to the
endogeneity of the population growth itself | for example, biases that could be induced by
the endogeneity of immigration. As can be seen in table 5, the resulting estimates for the
window 1979{1997 using these two instrumental variable strategy suggests an even stronger
increase in the e®ect of labor force growth than that found in table 1 (although less precise).
10Table 5: Cross-Country Regressions: Instrumental Variable Estimation
Init. Y
N % ¢ LF Init. Y
N % ¢ LF
Window 1960-78 1979-97
(1), IV Time{Varying Inst. -0.036 -.032 -0.011 -.584
(0.008) (0.220) (0.015) (0.275)
(2), IV Non{Time{Varying Inst. -0.036 -.032 -0.000 -1.361
(0.008) (0.222) (0.018) (0.640)
Note: Standard errors between parenthesis. In the time-varying case, we instrument
labor force by the countries' growth in active population over the given window. In the
non-time-varying case, we instrument labor force growth by the countries' growth in
active population over the period 1960{78 for all windows.
Hence, it is unlikely that the pattern we are highlighting is being driven by the endogeneity
of labor force growth.
Together, the results reported in tables 2 through 5 suggest that there has been a major
change in the determinants of labor productivity growth across industrial countries, whereby
the speed of converge has decreased and the e®ect of labor force growth has increased sub-
stantially.
3 An International Growth Model with Endogenous Techno-
logical Choice
The pattern presented in ¯gures 1 and 2 indicates a change in the determinants of labor
productivity growth over the period 1960{1997, with a decrease in the speed of convergence
and an increase in the importance of demographically driven employment growth. In this
section, we propose a technology based explanation to these observations. In particular, our
goal is to show that such a pattern may re°ect the process by which industrialized countries
have adjusted to a major technological change.
The type of major technological change we envision is one corresponding to the arrival
and dissemination of a new production process, where the extent and speed of adoption are
endogenously determined by country{speci¯c market forces. In this sense, the model we
develop shares features with the literature on General Purpose Technologies (GPT), and is
a particular case of the class of endogenous technological choice model which have featured
prominently in recent explanations of inequality trends.16 One important feature of our
16See for example, Acemoglu (1999), Basu and Weil (1998), Beaudry and Green (1998,2000), Caselli
11modelling approach is to propose an explanation to cross{country growth observation which
does not treat individual countries as autonomous entities but instead considers them as a
set of interlinked economies.17 This appears most relevant for the set of countries we are
considering.
Our approach in this section is as follows. We ¯rst set out a baseline model where there
are only two factors of production: a broad measure of capital and unskilled labor. We then
use this model to show how the arrival of an alternative production process can generate
the type of patterns depicted in ¯gures 1 and 2. We begin by a theoretical analysis which
highlights the qualitative properties of the model. We then complement this analysis by a
quantitative evaluation, which consists of an estimation and simulation strategy aimed at
examining whether the model can quantitatively reproduce the patterns of ¯gures 1 and 2.
Since our quantitative exercise consists of evaluating a dynamic general equilibrium model of
18 interlinked economies, the model is kept as simple as possible to render the task feasible.
As we shall show, the main technological feature that allows to explain the pattern depicted
in ¯gures 1 and 2 consists of the arrival and dissemination of a new production process with
the property that it uses accumulable factors more intensively; whether this greater intensity
involves greater intensive use of human capital, physical capital or both.
3.1 Theoretical Analysis
3.1.1 Technology
We consider a set of economies, indexed by i = 1;:::;N, which all produce the same ho-
mogenous good, that can be either consumed or invested. All ¯rms have access to the same
technological possibilities. Initially, ¯rms in all the countries produce output using a tradi-
tional and well{established production process which depends on capital Ki;t and e±cient
units of unskilled labor µtLi;t according to the following constant returns to scale production
function.
Yi;t = K®
i;t(µtLi;t)1¡® with ® 2 (0;1)
(1999)and Zeira (1998). The model of endogenous technological choice most closely related to the current
paper is probably that of Zeira (1998). Note that from a theoretical perspective, most models of endogenous
technological choice are simple reinterpretations of models of international trade.
17Ventura (1998) also proposes an explanation of international growth patterns within a framework of
interlinked economies. In ongoing work, we are examining the extent to which a model along the lines of
Ventura's can explain the observations presented in ¯gures 1 and 2.
12Throughout this section, we will refer to capital generically and interpret it as representing
an aggregate of human and physical capital.18
In the above production function, we allow for factor augmenting technological change
through growth in µt, which is assumed to evolve as
µt = (1 + °)µt¡1
where ° is the exogenous growth rate of µ.
As already stated, we want to also allow for radical technological change in the form of
the arrival and dissemination of a new production process. This radical technological change
takes the form of the arrival of an alternative modern production process which depends on




i;t(µtLi;t)1¡¯ with 0 < ® < ¯ < 1
We interpret this alternative production process | or alternative form of work organization
| as a General Purpose Technology that over time becomes a relevant means of production
as Á becomes su±ciently high. In e®ect, we can consider that initially © = 0 and hence this
technology is not operative. Conversely, as soon as © > 0, the ¯rm faces a menu of available
technologies to produce the same good. It therefore has to choose not only the amount of
total factor it will use to achieve the production of output, but also how to allocate it between
the two available technologies. In other words, technology adoption is an endogenous decision
of the ¯rm. Hence, with a T and M superscript denoting respectively the traditional and
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18Throughout this section, we rely on a broad de¯nition of capital which amounts to interpret it as an
aggregate of both human and physical capital. Since there is a large class of models where an explicit modelling
of human and physical capital leads to a reduced{form in which human and physical capital actually act as an
aggregate (see for example Barro and Sala{i{Martin (1995)), the approach is not overly restrictive. However,
since the appropriateness of such an interpretation may not be entirely transparent and in order to check the
robustness of our results, in the following section we extent the model to explicitly distinguish between human




Li;t > 0;Ki;t > 0;Y ¿
i;t > 0;L¿
i;t > 0;K¿
i;t > 0;¿ = fT;Mg
where Wi;t, the price of unskilled labor in economy i, and zi;t, the corresponding rental price
of capital, are taken as given by the ¯rm. To understand the implications of technological
adoption, it is helpful to conceptually view the ¯rm's decision problem as divided into two
phases. First, for given levels of K and L, the ¯rm must decide on what technology, or mix of
technologies, to adopt. Second, given the resulting optimal technological adoption decision,
the ¯rm can decide on the optimal level for K and L. The following proposition characterizes
the ¯rst stage of this decision process, that is, the optimal technological adoption decision.














































Proof: See appendix A.1.
Proposition 1 indicates that if the capital{labor ratio, K
µL, is su±ciently low relative to
©t, then it is optimal to only use the traditional technology. Alternatively, if it is su±ciently
high, then is it optimal to use only the modern technology. Finally, if K
µL is in the right ratio
relative to ©t, then it is optimal to use both technologies simultaneously. As we shall show,
equilibrium forces will cause the last regime to be operative over an extended period of time.
We will refer to this latter regime, where both technologies are operative, as the adoption
phase.
14A conceptually important implication that results from the adoption decision is summa-
rized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 During the adoption phase, aggregate technology is of the form AK + BµL.
Proof: See appendix A.2.
In other words, proposition 2 indicates that the adoption phase corresponds to aggregate
technology with an AK type structure| more precisely an AK + BµL structure. In e®ect,
during this phase, a change in K
µL implies a reallocation of capital and labor between the
two technologies, thereby avoiding the e®ects of decreasing returns. These two propositions
are illustrated in ¯gure 4, which reports the output{per{worker as a function of capital{
per{worker, both for the traditional and modern technologies. The thick line corresponds to
the aggregate technology implied by the optimal adoption regime. As can be seen from this















The ¯rm's complete decision problem gives rise to a demand function for labor and a
15demand function for capital, and thereby characterizes the demand side of the market. On
the supply side, we assume that the market for unskilled labor is a domestic market with the
supply determined entirely by domestic households. In contrast, we assume that households
supply capital to an international market and that it is ¯nancial intermediaries that allocate
the internationally available capital to domestic ¯rms. Hence, to complete the description of
the economy, we need to specify the objectives and the behavior of households and ¯nancial
intermediaries.
3.1.2 Household
For simplicity, households are assumed to live for one period and have a bequest motive that
leads to savings. Moreover, in each period there is the birth of a new cohort of households.
In the theoretical section of the paper, we could let households live for an arbitrary number
of periods instead of assuming they live only for one period. However, for the quantitative
analysis, it is helpful to adopt the metaphor of one period lived households with bequest
motives in order to generate simple savings behavior. To this end, we let households have
preferences over current consumption and have a bequest motive directed towards their re-
placement cohort. In economy i, the relative size of the new cohort is such that the rate
of population growth for this economy is ´i. Note that in the model, labor force growth,
employment growth and population growth are interchangeable terms.
In the one period of life, a household supplies one unit of labor to the market and therefore
receives the real wage, wi;t, to compensate for her work. She also receives pro¯ts from ¯nancial
intermediaries, ¼i;t, and a bequest, bi;t, left by generation t ¡ 1 to members of generation t.
These revenues are then used to consume, ci;t and save si;t. Therefore, the household faces a
budget constraint of the form




Savings will be transmitted to the next cohort in the form of a bequest after the application
of the international real interest rate rt+1, and we therefore have
bi;t+1 = si;t(1 + rt+1) (3.2)




U(ci;t) + V (bi;t+1)
subject to (3.1) and (3.2).
163.2 Financial intermediaries
Financial intermediaries make pro¯ts by borrowing capital from the international market, at
rate rt, and renting it to ¯rms at a net rate of zi;t ¡ ±, where ± is the rate of depreciation of
capital. In the absence of any transaction costs, competition between ¯nancial intermediaries
would drive the price of capital to ¯rms to rt + ±. However, we assume that intermediation
involves a cost ºi;t. In particular, we view this intermediation cost as a type of adjustment
cost which increases with the size of new capital °ows.19 Furthermore, we assume that the
marginal intermediation cost is taken as exogenous from the view point of an intermediary
and hence, competition assures that the cost of capital to domestic ¯rms is given by:
zi;t = rt + ± + ºi;t
With an adjustment cost interpretation in mind, we assume that the marginal intermediation
cost, ºi;t, takes the following form
ºi;t =
(






if Ki;t > Ki;t¡1
where Ki;t is the aggregate °ow of capital to country i and where º(¢) is an increasing function.
Note that given this form for the marginal intermediation costs, the total cost associated with



















19The assumption that there are frictions limiting international capital movements is consistent with the
evidence reviewed in Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000).
20The pro¯ts of ¯nancial intermediaries made in country i are ºi;tKi;t minus the total intermediation costs.
Indeed, we can actually think of the intermediary as solving the following program taking Ki;t¡1 as given:
max
Ki;t









An alternative interpretation of the model is one where ¯rms face a capital adjustment cost, but where ¯rms act
myopically by only internalizing the current adjustment cost when deciding on current investment. Although
it may be desirable to have ¯rms or ¯nancial intermediaries completely internalize the costs associated with
changing the stock of capital, such a modi¯cation greatly increase the complexity of the model without any







t=0 solves the ¯rms problem.
ii. given fwi;t;rtg1
t=0, fsi;tg1
t=0 solves the consumers problem.
iii. there exist no unexploited gains from trade in capital intermediation, that is, zi;t =





iv. The markets for labor and capital clear, that is,
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Li;t¡1si;t¡1; for t > 0
3.4 Basic properties
In order to highlight how the arrival of an alternative production process leads to departure
from the standard Solow growth model, we ¯rst want to emphasize some basic properties
of our model that relates to the determinants of cross{sectional outcomes in the absence of
technological choice. In particular, as stated in proposition 3, in the absence of technologi-
cal choice, our international model shares two central properties with the traditional Solow
growth model: these are convergence and the presence of a negative e®ect of labor force
growth on productivity growth.21
Proposition 3 In the absence of the alternative technology (©t = 0), cross-country growth in
output-per-worker will exhibit
i. a negative relationship with the initial level of output-per-worker, that is, it will exhibit
convergence;
ii. a negative relationship with the rate of labor force growth ´i, where the magnitude of
this e®ect is smaller than ®
Proof: See appendix A.3.
The main equilibrium forces underlying proposition 3 can be seen from the allocation






21It is well known that an international version of the Solow model with adjustment costs to capital generates
the properties of convergence and the negative e®ects of population growth on labor productivity growth. See
for example Barro-Sala-i-Martin (1995).
18the rental cost of capital inclusive of intermediation costs. In equilibrium, this relationship
is given by













i;t = (Ki;t ¡ Ki;t¡1)=Ki;t¡1 denotes the rate of growth of capital. In e®ect, the
above equation can be seen as determining the cross-sectional distribution of growth rates of
capital for a given world interest rate. From this relationship, it is easy to see that the rate
of growth of capital for a country is a decreasing function of its initial level of output-per-
worker. This allocation rule for capital thereby causes output growth in the model to exhibit
convergence, that is, higher initial labor productivity is associated with lower subsequent
growth in output{per{worker. Moreover, from the above relationship, we can see that the
rate of growth of capital will be positively related to labor force growth. However, this latter
e®ect will not be su±ciently strong to o®set the direct negative e®ect of labor force growth
on capital deepening. Hence, in our model, labor productivity grows more slowly in a high
population growth economy even though international capital mobility allows such a country
to attract more capital.
We are now in a position to examine how the introduction of an alternative technology
a®ects the equilibrium properties of the model. To this end, it is helpful to consider the
behavior of the model in the case where all economies are in the adoption phase, that is, in
the situation where they are simultaneously using both technologies.
Proposition 4 In the presence of the alternative technology, if all economies are in the adoption
phase, then cross{country growth in output-per-worker over such a period
i. will not exhibit convergence, that is, there will not be a negative relationship between
the initial level of output{per{worker and the growth in output{per{worker.
ii. will exhibit a negative relationship with the rate of labor force growth of a magnitude
greater than ®.
Proof: See appendix A.4.
Proposition 4 indicates that the process of technological adoption following the dissem-
ination of a new technology has the potential to signi¯cantly change the determinants of
cross{country growth in labor productivity. In particular, proposition 4 highlights that when
19countries are in the adoption phase, there will no longer be forces directly favoring conver-
gence of labor productivity, while there will be strong forces causing divergence in labor
productivity due to di®erence in labor force growth. Hence, after the dissemination of a
new general purpose technology, we are likely to observe a period of time where the speed
of convergence decreases substantially and where the magnitude of the negative relationship
between labor{force growth increases from something smaller than ® to something greater
than ®. These e®ects, which would be consistent with the observations in 1 and 2, should
arise as more and more countries start transiting towards the new technology and thereby
begin re°ecting the properties emphasized in proposition 4. An interesting aspect of this
proposition is that it gives quantitative insight with respect to how the introduction of a
new technology may a®ect the negative relationship between labor force growth and labor
productivity growth. For example, considering capital to be an aggregate of both human
and physical capital, the results of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) suggest that ® is greater
that 0.5 and possibly of the order of 0.7. Therefore, proposition 4 can be interpreted as
stating that the process of technological transition could cause the tradeo® between labor
productivity growth and labor force growth to increase from somewhere between zero and
0.5 to a magnitude greater than 0.6 or 0.7, which is precisely that observed in ¯gures 1 and
2.22
In order to understand proposition 4, it is helpful to distinguish two mechanisms driving
the result. The ¯rst mechanism relates to how the introduction of a new technology a®ects
each country's production possibility set. The second mechanism relates to how capital °ows
are determined when countries are in the adoption phase. It is the combination of both these
mechanism which lie behind proposition 4.
In terms of the production possibility set, the introduction of a new technology has
important implications. When ¯rms have a choice between two technologies, the optimal
adoption rule will lead them to convexify the possibility set and thereby cause the emergence
of a linear segment in the aggregate production technology, that is, it causes the emergence of
an AK +BµL type structure as indicated in proposition 2. To see this, consider again ¯gure
4 where we graph the two (traditional and modern) underlying technologies in intensive form
(i.e. Y=µL as a function of K=µL). Given these two technologies, there is a range of capital
labor ratios, K=µL 2 [k;k], where it is optimal to use both production processes. Over this
range, the marginal product of capital will not exhibit decreasing returns since this is avoided
22Since proposition 4 is mainly a qualitative statement, it does not tell us if the arrival of a new technology
could actually reproduce the size and the timing of the changes observed in ¯gures 1 and 2. It is for this
reason that we also provide a quantitative evaluation of the model.
20by reallocating factors between two techniques of production. Note that an improvement in
the modern technology (through a change in ©t) causes that AK + BµL segment to shift
to the left as it pivots upwards. It is interesting to note that, if a country were in autarky,
and the new technology gradually improved in terms of increases in ©t, then the economy
would appear to leave a Solow regime with diminishing returns, and enter an AK type regime.
Furthermore, during such a transition, an increase in ©t would cause the price of unskilled
labor to decrease, while simultaneously leading to an increase in the returns to factors that
can be accumulated.
In the case of internationally linked economies, the introduction of the new technology
a®ects cross{sectional growth properties through its e®ect on the allocation of capital. If
countries are in the adoption phase | in the AK + BµL segment | then the marginal
product of capital is equal to A in all these countries and the allocation of capital is driven
by the equation





= A 8i = 1;:::;N
therefore leading to
°k
i;t = º¡1(A ¡ rt ¡ ±) 8i = 1;:::;N
Hence, in this phase, the growth rate of capital is equalized across country and thereby
independent of both the country's initial level of labor productivity (within the relevant
range) and the countries labor force growth. Accordingly, capital labor ratios grow slower
in higher labor force growth countries by a proportionality factor of -1, and are no longer
driven by forces of convergence. This slower growth in capital labor ratio causes slower labor
productivity growth in proportion to the income share of capital. Since the income share
of capital along the technological transition is greater or equal to ® (the share of capital
in the traditional technology), this explains why such a technological transition can cause
the tradeo® between employment growth and labor productivity growth to increase to the
magnitude greater of ®. For example, if intermediation costs are very small, cross{sectional
growth in labor productivity would exhibit no substantial tradeo® with labor force growth
before the introduction of the new technology then, during the transition period, it would
exhibit a tradeo® greater than ®, and ¯nally, when (and if) the set of countries exit this
phase, there will be a return to a situation where there is no signi¯cant tradeo® between
labor force growth and labor productivity growth.
213.5 Quantitative Analysis
Our theoretical analysis suggests that the patterns highlighted in ¯gures 1 and 2 may re°ect a
technological transition which created a temporary AK accumulation phase, that is, a phase
where the aggregate production technology has an AK + BµL structure. In this section, we
explore the plausibility of this explanation by examining whether our model, once quanti¯ed,
can in e®ect reproduced the trends observed in ¯gures 1 and 2. To this end, we begin
by parameterizing our model, estimating the unknown parameters and then evaluating its
performance.
Basic methodology: Since the model is to be evaluated on quantitative grounds, we have
to specify functional forms for the utility function and the marginal intermediation cost. The
utility function is assumed to take the form
U(c) + V (b) = log(c) + Ã log(b)
and the marginal intermediation cost is kept as simple as possible
º(x) = º:x
Finally, we assume that ©t evolves over time as
©t+1 = (1 + ')©t
with ©0 > 0 given. ' represents the rate of growth of the relative productivity in the modern
technology. When ' = 0, then total factor productivity in the modern technology does
not increase faster than in the traditional technology. This will be taken as our benchmark
experiment (experiment I). If we now assume that ' > 0, then ©t grows at a constant rate
and therefore complements the growth in labor e±ciency at a constant pace.
This leaves us with 9 parameters to set: ®;¯;±;º;Ã;°;';©0 and µ0. Not all the parameters
will be estimated, for identi¯cation sakes, ± is set such that capital depreciates at an annual
rate of 6% (± = 0:06). All other 8 parameters will be estimated: £ = f®;¯;º;Ã;°;';©0;µ0g.
Our estimation strategy is based on a moment estimation method. The deep parameters
are obtained in order to minimize the discrepancy between a set of moments obtained from
the data and those obtained using the model. More speci¯cally, we select the deep parameters
of the model in order to replicate parameters from rolling regressions, as displayed in ¯gure 1
and 2. Hence, our world economy will consist of the 18 countries (N = 18) considered in the
22empirical study (see section 2). The initial distribution of revenues | in terms of output{
per{capita | and labor force growth | f´i;i = 1:::;Ng | are taken from the data. Since
we are to replicate the magnitude and evolution of the e®ects of both labor force growth
and initial conditions on productivity growth, we will attempt to replicate the 40 estimates
(2£20) related to the rolling regressions over the period 1960{97 with a window size of 19.
Hence the estimation procedure exhibits a degree of over{identi¯cation of 32.23
Given a set of moments (see the following section for the choice of the moments) and a
set of policy functions for the variables of interest, we adopt the following indirect inference
method to estimate parameters:
Step 1: Estimate a q-dimensional vector of moments (here q=40), m 2 M ½ Rq, from the data.
Hereafter, b mT denotes the estimated moments obtained from section 2.
Step 2: From the theoretical model, and given a vector of structural parameters, £, a path
for output{per{worker and labor force, denoted g ¡Y
L
¢
i;t(£); ~ Li;t(£); i = 1;:::;N, is
performed in each country.
Step 3: From these simulations, we estimate the moments ~ m(£), by running the same rolling
regressions as in the data.
Step 4: An estimate ~ £ for £ minimizes the quadratic form:
J(£) = (b mT ¡ ~ m(£))0WT (b mT ¡ ~ m(£))
where WT is a symmetric nonnegative matrix de¯ning the metric.
Steps 2 to 4 are conducted repeatedly until convergence | i.e. until a value of £ that
minimizes the objective function is obtained. From a practical point of view, the matrix WT
is the inverse of the variance matrix of the empirical moments, which we form by feeding the
diagonal with the variance of each estimated moment.
Two cases will be under study. In the ¯rst case, which will be labelled as experiment
I, we set ' = 0, therefore assuming that ©t is constant over time. The second experiment,
23In the model, labor force growth and population growth are identical. However, in the data they are not.
Hence it is necessary to decide what is the more appropriate empirical counterpart to ´i in the model. We
believe that labor force growth is the better empirical counterpart and therefore we perform the quantitative
exercise by comparing theoretical regressions using ´i as a regressor with empirical regressions using labor
force growth as a regressor. Note that when using labor force growth as a regressor, we instrument it with
population growth as to minimize biases due to the potential endogeneity of participation decisions.
23labelled as experiment II, relaxes the last assumption therefore assuming that productivity
in the modern means of production increases faster than in the traditional technology. Table
6 reports the results.
Table 6: Estimation results
Experiment I Experiment II Experiment III
® 0.48613 0.43433 0.46111
¯ 0.65140 0.60673 {
º 0.79581 1.07861 1.20023
Ã 8.27543 8.23692 8.27543
° 0.00000 0.00016 0.00000
©0 0.57800 0.36160 {
µ0 14.52487 8.90931 14.52487
' { 0.00431 {
J(£) 7.50700 3.80182 15.47780
A ¯rst interesting fact that emerges from table 6 is that the estimated value for ® is
reasonable in size, as we ¯nd a value close to 0.5 for both experiment under consideration.
The value for ¯ is much above ® as it lies between 0.60 and 0.65 in both experiment I
and II, therefore supporting our view that the patterns highlighted in ¯gures 1 and 2 may
re°ect the arrival of new means of production that exhibit lower diminishing returns to scale
with respect to factors that can be accumulated.24 Another result worth noting is that the
model does not need additional source of growth other than the labor force growth and the
introduction of the modern technology to replicate the data, as °, the rate of growth of labor
augmenting progress µt, is estimated to be essentially 0 in experiment I.25
Figure 5 graphs the estimates from rolling regression obtained from the data (dark line)
and the model (grey line). As can be seen from this ¯gure, the moments generated by
the model lie within the 1{standard deviation con¯dence interval associated to the empir-
ical moments (dashed line). Therefore, our theoretical framework is capable of replicating
statistically the empirical estimates from the rolling regressions (recall that the level of over{
identi¯cation is 33 in expriment I and 31 in experiment II).
It is worth noting that the existence of an exogenous process a®ecting ©t | which implies
24Note that this result was obtained without imposing ¯ > ® during the estimation.
25Note that this actually does not re°ect a problem of identi¯cation since the algorithm was feeded with
di®erent initial values for °, and always get to the same value. In case of identi¯cation problems, ° would
have been stuck at its initial level.
24Figure 5: Rolling regressions
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25that the new technology becomes increasingly attractive over time{ enhances the ability of
the model to replicate the rolling regressions. It is worth noting that under experiment II,
the gap between ® and ¯ is slightly higher relative to experiment I, implying that the relative
returns to factors that can be accumulated in the modern technology are marginally higher
than in experiment I. This is accompanied by an increase in the marginal intermediation
cost parameter, which rises from 0.80 to 1.10, implying for instance, that, assuming a rate
of growth of capital of 3%, the marginal intermediation costs increases from 2.39% in the
¯rst experiment to 3.24% in the second. Note that preferences are left una®ected by the
introduction of a time varying ©t, as Ã | the weight attached to bequest in the utility
function | is only marginally a®ected across the two experiments. In order to gauge the
empirical relevance of such numbers, we report in table 7 the average annual rate of growth of
world capital and the associated real interest rate. The numbers reported in the table indicate
that the estimated parameters for the technology are quite consistent with the actual evidence
on capital accumulation in the end of the twentieth century. Finally, in table 7, we also report
the cross-country variance of z (that is, the cross-country variance of the marginal product
of capital)26 as well as its average absolute deviation. Interestingly, the model produces
di®erences in the marginal product of capital that appear of reasonable magnitude.
Table 7: Basic statistics
Experiment I Experiment II Experiment III
°k 3.61% 3.02% 3.26%
r 2.42% 0.76% 0.16%
¾z 0.88% 1.24% 1.32%
Ejz ¡ zj 0.69% 0.97% 1.03%
In order to illustrate the functioning of the model, ¯gure 6 illustrates a particular counter-
factual where we shut down the adjustment costs (that is, we take the limit case as º tends
to 0), and we track the evolution of labor{productivity of the 18 economies over time as they
adopt the new technology.27 Note that because º is taken to zero, in the ¯rst (traditional)
and third (modern) phases of the dynamics, the economies do not di®er in there level of
output-per-worker since capital mobility equalizes labor productivity across countries. As
can be seen from the ¯gure, as soon as they reach a high enough level of capital stock,
the economies enter the adoption phase. The rate of growth of capital they experiment
is equalized as they are in a zone where there are no decreasing returns to accumulation
(AK + BµL zone). This ¯gure illustrates more particularly the ¯rst item of proposition 4.
26We calculated this variance for each year, and took the average over the entire period.
27Note that productivity has been normalized by its initial level in this graph.
26In e®ect, when all economies are in the ¯rst phase, they converge to the same path. In
contrast, when the economies enter the AK phase, the convergence process is stopped, as
re°ected by the divergent evolution of labor productivity. Note that even in this limit case
where international capital mobility is becoming perfect, our model suggests that the set of
countries would take about 15 years to go through the transition phase when ® = 0:486 and
¯ = 0:651. The last experiment we conduct (experiment III) is aimed at illustrating that
Figure 6: Evolution of productivity without intermediation costs (º = 0)




























Note: Each line corresponds to the evolution of productivity of a given country,
each country being characterized by a di®erent rate of population growth.
we actually need to depart the standard growth model to explain the data. In particular, in
experiment III we investigate what happens when only the traditional technology is available.
The model is therefore estimated imposing ©t = 0 for all t > 0, implying that neither ¯ nor
' are identi¯able.28 As can be seen from the fourth column of table 6, the value of the
objective function is signi¯cantly and negatively a®ected by this assumption. In fact, as can
be seen from ¯gure 7 the model is unable to account for the variations in the parameters of
the rolling regressions. Nevertheless, as predicted by proposition 3, the model generates a
negative covariance between the rate of growth of labor and productivity growth on the one
28Due to identi¯cation problems, we estimated the model of experiment III with µ0 and Ã set to their
estimated level in experiment I.
27side, and a negative covariance between the initial conditions and productivity growth on the
other side. But, the time pattern of these coe±cients is °at. Therefore, it clearly appears
Figure 7: Rolling regressions
(a) Experiment III
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Labor Force Growth Parameter
that the introduction of the modern technology is crucial to mimic the time varying pattern
of the e®ects of labor force growth on productivity growth, and the convergence parameter.
4 An Extended Model with Human and Physical Capital Ac-
cumulation
4.1 The theoretical model
4.1.1 Technology
Let us again consider a set of economies, indexed by i = 1;:::;N, which all produce the
same homogenous good, that can be either consumed or invested. Each ¯rm in each country
has access to the same technological possibilities. Initially, ¯rms in all the countries produce
output using the traditional production process which now depends on physical capital Ki;t,







with ®k 2 (0;1), ®h 2 (0;1) and ®k + ®h < 1
As in the model of the previous section, we allow for factor augmenting technological
28change through growth in µt, which is assumed to evolve as
µt = (1 + °)µt¡1
where ° is the exogenous growth rate of µ.
As already stated, the model takes into account the possibility of a more radical techno-
logical change in the form of the arrival and dissemination of a new production process, which
takes the form of an alternative modern production process which depends on the same three






with ¯k 2 (0;1), ¯h 2 (0;1) and 0 < ®k + ®h < ¯k + ¯h < 1
With a T and M superscript denoting respectively the traditional and modern means of








i;t + Y M





























i;t > 0;¿ = fT;Mg
where Wi;t ,the price of unskilled labor in economy i, and zi;t, the corresponding rental price
of capital, and qi;t the price of human capital are taken as given by the ¯rm.
4.1.2 Household
Like in our benchmark model, household are assumed to live for one period, and in each
period there is the birth of a new cohort of households. Household have preferences over
current consumption and have a bequest motive directed towards their replacement cohort.
In economy i, the relative size of the new cohort is such that the rate of population growth
for this economy is ´i.
29At time t, each household receives from the previous generation a transfer in the form of
physical capital, denoted si;t¡1, and a transfer in the form of human capital, denoted xi;t¡1.
Furthermore, the household receives its share of pro¯ts from ¯nancial intermediaries, which
is denoted ¼i;t. The household supplies inelastically to the domestic market both its unskilled
labor and its human capital as to receive total wage income equal to wi;t + xi;t¡1qi;t; where
Wi;t is the price of unskilled labor and qi;t is the rental price of human capital. The household
supplies its inherited physical capital to the international capital market as to receive total
physical capital income si;t¡1(1 + rt). The household uses its total revenues to consume, ci;t
and save for each member of its replacement cohort, where savings can be in the form of
either human capital (xi;t) or physical capital (si;t). Therefore, the household faces a budget
constraint that takes the following form.
ci;t + (si;t + xi;t)(1 + ´i) = wi;t + qi;txi;t¡1 + (1 + rt)si;t¡1 + ¼i;t (4.3)
The total value of the bequest left by a household at time t is expressed as follows.
bi;t+1 = (si;t(1 + rt+1) + qi;t+1xi;t)(1 + ´i) (4.4)
The household decides on how much to consume and save as to maximize her utility
max
fci;t;si;t;xi;t;bi;t+1g
U(ci;t) + V (bi;t+1)
subject to (4.3) and (4.4).
4.1.3 Equilibrium
The behavior of ¯nancial intermediaries is essentially the same as the one described in the
previous section. Therefore, an equilibrium for this economy consists of a sequence of prices
frt;wi;t;zi;t;qi;t;i = 1;:::;Ng1

















t=0 solves the ¯rms problem.
ii. given fwi;t;qi;t;rtg1
t=0, fsi;t;xi;tg1
t=0 solves the consumers problem.
iii. there exist no unexploited gains from trade in capital intermediation, that is, zi;t =





30iv. The markets for labor, human and physical capital clear, that is,
LT
i;t + LM
i;t = Li;0(1 + ´i)t; for t > 0 and i = 1;:::;N
HT
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Li;tsi;t¡1; for t > 0
4.2 Quantitative analysis
In this section we assess the potential quantitative gains pertaining to the disaggregation of
capital between human and physical capital. The quantitative evaluation of the model relies
on the same methodology as the one used in the previous section. In particular, we maintain
the same assumptions on the speci¯cation of utility and marginal intermediation cost. Table
8 reports the estimation results for our two benchmark experiments: experiment I assumes
a constant ©t and experiment II assumes a growing ©t.
Table 8: Estimation results












As should be expected, the objective function is lower than in our previous model, as
disaggregation of capital between human and physical capital adds two parameters to the
model ®h and ¯h and therefore brings in additional °exibility in the model and potential
informational in the estimation. The model still supports our view that the empirical facts
may re°ect the arrival of new means of production exhibiting lower diminishing returns to
scale with respect to factors that can be accumulated. Indeed, in the two experiments, we
obtain a value for ®k +®h lying between 0.50 and 0.60, while ¯k +¯h lies within the interval
0.65{0.70. Note for instance, that under experiment I, not only does the sum ®k+®h < ¯k+¯h
31but we also get ®h < ¯h, re°ecting the fact that the new means of production display
less diminishing returns to human capital. It is also worth noting that the value of ®k
and ¯k are about the same29 and more remarkably are both about 0.40 which corresponds
approximately to the share of capital in value added in industrialized economies. Also note
that disaggregating capital does not a®ect the value of Ã | the preference parameter |
which remains close to the estimated value obtained in our benchmark model. It is however
worth reporting that the marginal intermediation costs has risen compared to the previous
model, in which case the intermediation costs a®ected the aggregate accumulable factor,
while it now only a®ects physical capital. One ¯nal aspect to note from Table 8 is that, in
Experiment II, the nature of the technological change inferred by imposing our model on the
data is essentially a \skilled biased technological change", that is, our estimates suggests that
the main characteristic of the new technology is its greater human capital intensity. 30 In
e®ect, our estimate of ¯k in Experiment II is identical to our estimate of ®k.
Figure 8 reports the rolling regression obtained from the data (dark line) and the model
(grey line). As can be seen from this ¯gure, the model replicates both the pattern and the level
of the parameters of the rolling regressions. In particular, the model can account remarkably
well for the diminishing convergence parameter across the sample. Further, it appears that,
compared to our benchmark model, splitting capital between human and physical capital
enhances the ability of the theoretical model to mimic the increasing e®ect of labor force
growth on labor productivity growth, and it is particularly consistent with Jorgensen and Yip
(1999) estimate the growth in physical capital among G7 countries, which average between 4
and 6% over the period 1960{95. It should however be noted that this is obtained at a higher
real interest rate and a higher cross-country variance of z, as re°ected in table 9.
Table 9: Basic statistics




Ejz ¡ zj 1.92% 2.43%
To gauge the timing of events, ¯gure 9 reports the number of countries in each phase
(traditional, adoption, modern production process) over time, therefore illustrating the dy-
29In this version of the model we imposed ®k 6 ¯k during the estimation phase in order to assure convergence
of our estimation method.
30Such an observation is consistent with the view that recent technological change across industrialized
countries has been mostly skill-biased. See for example: Berman, Bound and Machin (1998).
32Figure 8: Rolling regressions
(a) Experiment I
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33namics of the adoption process across countries. As can be seen, the adoption process starts
Figure 9: Adoption Dynamics
Experiment I Experiment II
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sooner in experiment I, as the ¯rst country enters the adoption phase in 1972, whereas un-
der experiment II, the ¯rst country to adopt the modern technology waited until 1976. In
both cases, most economies enter the adoption phase in the 80s and no country has totally
abandoned the traditional technology by the end of the sample.
5 Conclusion
Over the last quarter of a century, economic performance across major industrialized countries
has been characterized by some country having good performance in terms of labor produc-
tivity growth while other having had good performance in terms of employment growth. Very
few countries have had good performance on both fronts over long periods.31 The object of
this paper has been to shed light regarding the apparent increasing tradeo® between pro-
ductivity and employment growth observed since the mid-seventies. Our answer is that this
tradeo® has emerged as the result of these countries undergoing a major technological change.
In particular, we have shown how the endogenous adoption of a new production process can
induce an AK accumulation phase where the negative tradeo® between employment growth
and productivity growth becomes greatly ampli¯ed for a temporary period. Our estimates of
31Among the very advanced countries, only Luxembourg has performed remarkably well on both front.
Ireland is another possible exception, but in the early part of our sample, it was so far behind the set of
advance industrialized countries that it appears to us to deserve an more idiosyncratic explanation. For
example, the reduction of corporate taxation in Ireland (which in our model can have huge e®ects) may key
to understanding the dramatic catchup experienced in Ireland.
34this process suggests that it has been in e®ect for the last 20 to 25 years, and that only now
may it becoming to an end. Obviously, if it is coming to an end, it suggests that countries
with high rates of population growth may perform relatively better in terms of labor pro-
ductivity growth in the near future than in the recent past. The US experience since 1996
provides some preliminary evidence to this e®ect whereby, as documented by Jorgensen and
Stiroh (2000), labor productivity growth has recently picked up due to an increase in the
speed of capital deepening.
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37A Proof of propositions
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1













































































(i) When only the traditional technology is at work, we have Ki;t = KT
i;t and Li;t = LT
i;t.


























(ii) When only the modern technology is at work, we have Ki;t = KM
i;t and Li;t = LM
i;t. For






















The result then follows. ¤
A.2 Proof of proposition 2










































and hence output can be written as
Yi;t = Y T






















which is of the form AK + BµtL. ¤
A.3 Proof of proposition 3
Let us de¯ne the growth in output-per-worker at time t as the log{di®erence between periods
t and t¡1 (which is consistent with our empirical analysis). In the absence of the alternative
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i;t is implicitly determined by the condition






















® (1 + °k
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Further, it is straightforward to check that the term inside the parenthesis in (A.14) is
negative, which together with
@°k
i;t










@ ln(1 + ´i)
< 0
¤
40A.4 Proof of proposition 4









































where the values for A and B are given in the proof of Proposition 2.
In the above equations, note that °k
t is not indexed by i since in the transition phase °k
t
is equal across countries as it is determined by the relationship ° = º¡1(A ¡ rt ¡ ±), and is


























































































i denotes the income share of capital in the technological adoption phase.
¤
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